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ECONOMIC SYSTEMS. An enormous
variety of experiences and possibilities characterized
African economic systems at the beginning of the
twenty-first century. Small village communities con-
tinued to till the soil and raise goats, sheep, cows, and
chickens using the same techniques of their grand-
fathers, renewing all the while traditions of social
solidarity and hospitality that have characterized rural
Africa for centuries. Overhead, however, multinational
corporations owned and operated by African nationals
organized transcontinental air travel, microwave and
satellite transmissions, and cell phone networks.
Africa globalized with the rest of the world, though
in different ways. Exports of goods and services stag-
nated even as migration generated new diaspora
communities (often illegal as Europe and the United
States erected obstacles to legal migration). Imports
of new technologies failed to surprise jaded villagers
who realized that MP3 files had already replaced
their still-fresh compact disc collections.
International assistance networks, for provision
of services from health care to peace keeping,
became important institutions in most countries.
Some countries collapsed in civil war, while others
continued to build asphalt highways that hastened
regional integration.
One generalization was pertinent and increas-
ingly self-evident at the close of the first decade of
the twenty-first century: African economic systems
were intimately linked to increasingly unstable and
violent mechanisms for regulating political power.
The problem of ensuring political order repeatedly
spilled over into the economic realm, impeding
ordinary persons from earning a living and bringing
investments to fruition.
The seriousness of the problem of political
order was manifest in the sheer number of violent
civil conflicts in Africa. About half of the countries
in sub-Saharan Africa experienced at least one year
of civil war after 1980, and more often experienced
sustained civil conflicts that lasted many years, even
decades. These included Angola, Burundi, Chad,
Congo (Kinshasa and Brazzaville), Côte d’Ivoire,
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mozam-
bique, Namibia, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone,
Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Uganda, and Zim-
babwe. Sudan, for example, saw civil war in the
south from 1983 to 2005, and also war in the
western region of Darfur at low intensity over
much of the period and then catastrophically vio-
lent in the period from 2003 to 2007, spilling over
into Chad and Central African Republic. The Dem-
ocratic Republic of the Congo, formerly Zaire, saw
civil war, including incursions by numerous neigh-
boring states, over the decade from 1994 to 2004.
Somalia saw warlord rule and conflict even within
Mogadishu, the capital city and largest urban area
of the country, for the period from 1991 to 2005.
Rwanda saw a genocidal slaughter of perhaps
800,000 persons in six months in 1994. Côte
d’Ivoire experienced a brief, year-long spasm of
violence in 2002 that resulted in partition of the
country, with the north ruled by rebel forces.
Civil conflicts significantly hampered the viabil-
ity of formal, large-scale organization of economic
activity. The mid-sized city of Bouaké, in Côte
d’Ivoire, was largely abandoned in the civil war of
2003. Freetown, the capital of Liberia, was invaded
by Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) forces during the
height of the conflict. Southern Sudan saw virtually
no building for twenty years, as northern military
forces repeatedly bombed southern infrastructure
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including schools and hospitals. Civil conflicts also
generated large numbers of internally displaced per-
sons. These internal and external refugees grew
increasingly reliant on an international system of
aid delivery, that itself became an integral compo-
nent of many economic systems across the conti-
nent. Observers coined or resuscitated terms to
describe these economies characterized by violent
and dysfunctional polities: warlord economies; col-
lapsed or failed states; aid-dependant states; and
refugee economies. Understanding the systems that
regulated economic life for ordinary persons in these
economies involved investigation of blood diamonds,
transnational arms flows, money laundering, compas-
sion fatigue, and the political economy of interna-
tional military intervention and nonintervention.
Political processes were not always the bane of
economic development in Africa. At independence
in the 1960s, much hope rested on state-directed
transformation and investment. The colonial powers
had imposed economic systems designed to provide
raw materials and profits to favored enterprises,
whether colonial planters, processors, trading firms,
or small manufacturers. Cotton, cocoa, and coffee
in West Africa were the clearest examples; African
producers were at the bottom of a colonially con-
trolled commodity chain. In temperate zones, such
as Kenya and South Africa, the exploitation of tea
plantations and mining operations was directed
by white settlers. Populations were displaced and
regulated to serve the colonial enterprises. In col-
onies without high-value export crops or mineral
resources, agricultural commodities were pro-
duced by small farmers using few purchased inputs.
Farmers were taxed indirectly by monopolies that
distributed desirable consumer goods (such as
soap, sugar, radios, and bicycles).
These economies were to be transformed after
independence through heavy state involvement in
economic activity. Agriculture in particular was tar-
geted, as well as industrial processing of agricul-
tural commodities. Sudan, for example, launched
Operation Breadbasket, an ambitious complex of
agricultural investments intended to open and
mechanize the vast and underutilized clay plains
of central Sudan. Tanzania, likewise, collectivized
scattered hamlets and resettled villagers in larger
centers, and sought to mechanize large agricultural
areas. Many countries passed agrarian reform laws
declaring all land property of the state. Other sec-
tors were similarly transformed. Mines were nation-
alized, and petroleum revenues appropriated by the
state, for the benefit of the people. Governments
launched development banks to finance state-
controlled industries and services. In some coun-
tries, revolutionary leaders inspired by socialism
and allied with the Soviet Union proposed far-
reaching transformations.However, overall, imple-
mentation of state-led development was similar
across the continent, if only because the capacity
of newly independent states to project their project
across the national territory was limited.
The intellectual justifications and political
economy explanations of these programs were two-
fold. First, political elites in newly independent
regimes felt that peasant farming and a small colo-
nially oriented bourgeoisie would neither modern-
ize nor invest quickly enough to generate a large
surplus that could fuel rapid industrialization and
pay for expensive urban infrastructure. Second, the
new elites that inherited colonial power had seen
how the state could be used to generate economic
advantage by ‘‘clients’’ of the ‘‘patrons’’ holding
state office. The precarious political position of the
postindependence governing classes impelled them
to attempt to extract and control as much advant-
age as possible from the power of the state.
The transforming project of many postinde-
pendence elites succeeded in only a handful of
countries. Botswana was the clear star performer,
with gross domestic product (GDP) per person
growing by 6 percent annually over the period
from 1980 to 2004. Literacy rates for youth
improved from an already high level of 70 percent
in 1980 to 90 percent in 2005. (Literacy for youth
in Burkina Faso, by contrast, barely reached 20
percent.) Hundreds of miles of road infrastructure
were built, most notably the trans-Kalahari high-
way. This growth occurred even as the HIV/AIDS
epidemic lowered life expectancy to thirty-five years
and resulted in more than 60,000 orphans by
2005. The government moved aggressively to
combat the epidemic and its effects, committing
to education, women’s empowerment, and free
distribution of anti-retroviral therapy for HIV-pos-
itive persons.
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Post-apartheid, the African National Congress
government of South Africa likewise revealed itself
to be a prudent manager of the national economy,
pursuing cautious policies during the decade after
1994 despite the temptations of retaliatory nation-
alization following the peaceful transition to major-
ity rule. GDP per capita remained steady in this
period fraught with tension. One policy that con-
tributed strongly to social peace and the sense of
commitment to the continuity of the South African
state and its economic institutions was the exten-
sion of state pensions to the black population fol-
lowing the transition. The resulting transfer of
purchasing power to the elderly empowered key
persons in society and benefited the health and
schooling of their grandchildren.
For most African countries, however, the increas-
ingly state-centric economic systems that emerged
after independence proved fragile in the face of
global economic shocks of the 1970s and 1980s.
Oil prices rose following OPEC’s cartelization of
the market. Interest rates on foreign loans rose in
response to the global recession, collapse of the
Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates, and
Latin American debt crisis. Shaky political regimes
became beholden to international lending author-
ities such as the International Monetary Fund and
the World Bank, which diagnosed state intervention
as the problem, and conditioned further lending
during the 1980s and 1990s on state disengagement.
The famous Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs)
of the period proved disastrous, as multilateral lend-
ers failed to realize, at best, the precarious political
equilibria of most countries, or, at worst, were com-
plicit in the massive corruption that exacerbated
the economic woes of the countries under their
surveillance.
African economies saw declines in many meas-
ures of well-being, over the quarter century from
1980 to 2004. Life expectancy at birth remained
below fifty years, and declined in numerous coun-
tries in southern Africa largely due to the HIV/
AIDS epidemic (which may have been preventable
through effective public action) and little progress
in reducing deaths attributable to diarrhea, malaria,
and tuberculosis. By 2004, most countries had only
about one-half of births attended by skilled health
personnel, and consequently infant and maternal
mortality were very high. Gross national income
(GNI), the value of goods and services produced
by nationals of a country in a year, declined for
almost half of African countries from 1960 to
2000, when measured in inflation adjusted dollars
and on a per-person basis.
By the 1990s there was no longer a single Afri-
can experience. Three groups of countries could be
distinguished.
The first included those countries that experi-
enced modest growth without civil conflict, after
the 1980s. These included countries that emerged
from the downturns and political instability of the
1980s with more open political systems and eco-
nomic stability, with states pursuing more modest
interventions in the economic sphere. Such was the
case for a number of West African states, including
Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mali, and Senegal. Mozam-
bique, Uganda, and Rwanda likewise returned to a
semblance of tenuous normalcy following the con-
flicts of the 1980s and 1990s. Many countries in
southern Africa likewise remained politically stable
and saw modest economic development, even as
the HIV/AIDS pandemic devastated the quality
of life.
A second group included the oil exporters,
both old and new, that continued to experience
grave difficulties in integrating the wealth from
oil exports into a dynamic economy; they were
afflicted by the ‘‘natural resource curse.’’ Many
saw large increases in GDP, though the equitable
distribution of oil revenues typically remained scan-
dalously deficient. Equatorial Guinea was the prime
example: GDP grew fantastically from 1995 to
2005 as oil companies invested billions of dollars
to exploit offshore fields, but the ordinary citizen
benefited little from the growth. Corruption grew
exponentially. Riggs Bank, a prominent Washing-
ton, D.C., bank, was fined $25 million by U.S.
regulators for collusion with government officials
in Equatorial Guinea, including the president, to
steal hundreds of millions of dollars of public
money. Similar situations were apparent in two
other new oil exporters, Chad and Sudan. Sudan
began exporting oil in 1999, but the unwillingness
of the ruling elite to share the benefits of oil rev-
enues led to uprisings and horrific retaliation by
government militias in the marginalized region
of Darfur. The Darfur crisis spilled over to Chad
and rebel groups threatened the military regime of
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Idriss Déby, who abnegated on promises to use oil
revenues for antipoverty programs.
Finally, Africa’s largest oil exporter and most
populous country, Nigeria, teetered for decades
between extremely corrupt military rule and disor-
dered informalization of economic activity. The
Nigerian oil economy, insulated from local politics
in most countries, became fully politicized, with
local militia groups organizing armed takeovers of
drilling platforms in desperate bids to secure prom-
ised community development funds. Elections set
for 2007 were the major hope for a return to
political stability and transparent governance.
A third group included those countries that
remained mired in political crisis, with consequent
economic retrogression. These included Guinea,
Liberia, Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire, Somalia,
Ethiopia, and Eritrea. Fiscal and monetary policy
sometimes exhibited stunning breakdowns, most
starkly in the case of Zimbabwe, where inflation
topped 1,000 percent per year in 2006, and formal
sector activity ground to a halt.
There was also considerable variety across eco-
nomic sectors and systems. The majority of people
in Africa continued to derive most of their liveli-
hood from the agricultural sector. Agriculture
accounted for only about 20 percent of value
added in the region, but 60 percent of the popula-
tion resided in rural areas. Technical change
and new crop varieties transformed some agricul-
tural regions, even as agriculture overall stagnated
with the breakdown of marketing infrastructure
that accompanied state collapse and civil conflict.
In West Africa, peasant farmers proved adept at
transforming agricultural practices: pineapple
exports grew rapidly in Ghana; cotton farmers con-
tinued to earn substantial income, even as U.S. and
European Union production subsidies negatively
impacted world prices for cotton; shea butter,
largely collected and processed by women, became
a major export for use in creams and lotions.
In East Africa, the cut flower industry grew
rapidly, serving the European market. In Central
Africa, new varieties of cassava spread throughout
the region, leading to increased yields and less
production risk. But there were also agricultural
failures on the continent. Zimbabwe’s botched
takeover and redistribution of commercial white
farmers led to a 30 percent drop in agricultural
output from 2000 to 2005. Farmers in Burkina
Faso had initial successes exporting green beans
to Europe, but undependable air cargo services
and more complex food regulations in the
European Union led to stagnation in the sector.
Agriculture depends heavily on systems of rural
land tenure, and these were in continuous flux
across the continent. After the state arrogated to
itself ultimate title over land, it became apparent
that most states had neither the capacity nor the
restraint to encourage efficient use of land and
fairly resolve disputes. Communal and traditional
tenure systems continued to thrive, even as farmers
increasingly came to understand their rights to
particular plots of land as private rights. In the
1990s, partly at the behest of international donors,
states began experimenting with decentralization
and communalization of land tenure, with varying
effects and experiences across the continent.
Telecommunication services saw stunning
growth across the continent as cell phone licenses
were granted to private entrepreneurs, and as
Internet cybercafés responded to a large demand
for connectivity. Mobile phones began penetrating
rural areas, where a significant minority of the pop-
ulation derived large benefit from the ability to
coordinate or save face-to-face meetings. By 2005
approximately 10 percent of the population was
using mobile phone services.
African economies, with the exception of
South Africa, continued with small and inefficient
industrial sectors despite the investments of the
postindependence decades, and these largely stag-
nated during the 1980 to 2005 period. Bottling
plants, industrial tanneries, soap manufacturing,
and plastics facilities operated at extremely low lev-
els of capacity and efficiency. Investment in new
equipment generally yielded low returns, and many
multinational manufacturing concerns shuttered or
sold their African operations. Instead, informal
workshops became the modest growth engines of
urban agglomerations, recycling metal and wood
for small-scale production and construction.
Systems of corruption in public office became
the focus of considerable attention during the
1990s. The World Bank and other international
organizations made good governance a central plank
in lending and assistance to the continent, and
N E W E N C Y C L O P E D I A O F A F R I C A 177
E C O N O M I C S Y S T E M S
conducted extensive research documenting and ana-
lyzing the strong link between corruption and poor
economic performance. Corruption audits, for exam-
ple, revealed tremendous misallocation of public
funds for schooling and antipoverty funds. In
Uganda, an audit estimated that only 13 percent of
the funds allocated for schools reached the intended
recipients; the remaining funds could not be properly
accounted for. Audits in Ghana, Tanzania, and
Zambia likewise found that more than 50 percent of
allocations disappeared.
International prioritizing of good governance
led regimes across the continent to at least pay lip
service to new standards of transparency and
accountability. There were, however, few cases of
successful anticorruption efforts. Corruption scan-
dals rocked the Daniel arap Moi government of
Kenya, and the Mwai Kibaki government that suc-
ceeded Moi ostensibly carried the election because
of an anticorruption platform. Kibaki’s anticorrup-
tion czar, John Githongo, released a report detail-
ing the corrupt activities of government ministers.
The report read like a primer on state corruption,
named names, and provided documentary evi-
dence. But Githongo was rebuffed by the president
and subsequently sought asylum in the United
Kingdom. In Nigeria, transition from the corrupt
military leader Sani Abacha to the elected President
Olesegun Obasonjo was likewise accompanied by
a perception of Obasonjo as a corruption fighter.
After five years of rule most observers felt Obasonjo
had not been able to deflect the state from its corrupt
ways. The anticorruption organization Transparency
International continued to rank African countries at
the bottom of their corruption index. Only Bot-
swana, South Africa, and Namibia scored in the top
one-third of countries around the globe, and Ghana
and Burkina Faso were the only other African coun-
tries in the top 100.
There was also variation across the continent
in women’s place in economic systems. Women in
many regions of the continent continued to be
denied rights to self-ownership in both national
and local juridical settings. The rights of women
in family law, especially in inheritance of assets,
remained as brakes on women’s abilities to invest
and profit from their entrepreneurial talents, even
as they were a major source of poorly remunerated
farm and household labor. But progressive policies
toward women in Botswana and South Africa, and
continued prominence of women entrepreneurs
in West Africa, pointed the way for unleashing a
largely untapped potential.
The beginning of the twenty-first century saw
three major incipient changes likely to significantly
affect African economic systems. First, as China and
India developed, the scale economies from urban
agglomerations in those countries (concentrations
of skilled labor, second-hand factory equipment,
deep knowledge bases of financial intermediaries)
meant that prices of their exported industrial prod-
ucts continued to decline. African economies
were likely to face continued difficulties in devel-
oping industrial sectors. The opportunity to import
consumer goods at low prices, however, would
generate significant benefits and increases in real
income for the average African consumer. Also,
the rapid economic development in China and
India meant that entrepreneurs in those countries
were increasingly seeking foreign investment
opportunities in Africa. Indeed, by 2005 there was
considerable evidence that Indian and Chinese dia-
spora networks and multinational corporations were
expanding rapidly in Africa.
Second, trade liberalization offered significant
opportunities across the continent. The United
States encouraged textile growth through its Africa
Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). The end-
ing of the Multi-Fiber Agreement, the interna-
tional quota system for textiles, while initially
favoring China, would eventually come to favor
African producers. The World Trade Organization
sponsored global talks to liberalize trade in agricul-
tural commodities, known as the Doha Round,
which held the potential to end the harmful sub-
sidies and protectionist policies of the United
States and Europe.
Third, Africans themselves had been migrating
out of the region in accelerating numbers, and new
immigrant communities in Europe and North Amer-
ica were generating large remittance flows back to
the region. Money transfer firms such as Western
Union and Moneygram expanded throughout the
region. The diasporas were also creating a new gen-
eration of Africans of dual nationalities, educational
backgrounds, and outlooks. This new generation
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was likely to significantly globalize African econo-
mies, in positive ways, though there remained the
danger that the ‘‘brain drain’’ could reinforce the
cycle of political instability and economic stagnation
seen in many countries.
The three new constituencies—new investors
from China and India, exporters operating in a
more liberalized global marketplace, and African
diaspora communities— together had the potential
in many countries to reverse the downward politi-
cal-economic spiral, and reinforce in other coun-
tries the process of consolidating equitable eco-
nomic growth.
See also Agriculture; Brazzaville; Déby Itno, Idriss; Dis-
ease: HIV/AIDS, Social and Political Aspects; Eco-
nomic History; Globalization; International Mone-
tary Fund; Kibaki, Mwai; Kinshasha; Labor; Moi,
Daniel arap; Obasanjo, Olusegun; Sudan: Wars;
Poverty; Women: Women and the Law; World
Bank.
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ECONOMICS AND THE STUDY OF
AFRICA. At the time most African countries
became independent, Africa was not seen by econ-
omists as particularly different from other parts of
the developing world. In fact, many thought it was
at an advantage, often enjoying levels of gross
domestic product (GDP) per head quite a bit
higher than those recorded for, say, India or
China. Moreover, most of Africa had inherited
from colonization institutions and infrastructure
thought to be prerequisite for growth. The prog-
nosis for Africa was thus fairly optimistic and, until
the mid-1970s when African growth faltered, it
seemed in agreement with the facts.
Consequently, the early period of economic
research on Africa is characterized by concerns
about how to manage rapid growth and the struc-
tural transformation of African economies that was
to ensue. The focus was on absorptive capacity
(could Africa absorb all the foreign investment?),
structural transformation (how to ensure that
workers and entrepreneurs had the qualifications
required to switch from traditional to modern sec-
tors and modes of production), and urbanization
(how to generate the revenue necessary to provide
the infrastructure and social services required by a
rapidly growing urban population).
During this period most of the emphasis was
on macro and sectoral issues. This body of research
is perhaps best exemplified by the 1986 work of
Hollis Chenery and his team at the World Bank.
According to the Keynesian policy views of the
time, the state was expected—and encouraged—
to take a proactive role in the economy. The rapid
Africanization of the public sector was seen as nor-
mal and the nationalization of many sectors of the
economy as potentially beneficial.
In the shadow of the dominant macroeco-
nomic discourse, a strong tradition of fieldwork-
based microeconomic research was also taking
roots in the continent. Although economic field-
work resembles anthropology in many respects and
has often borrowed ideas and methods from it, the
emphasis on surveys and statistical analysis is inher-
ited from agricultural economics. During this
period much of the microeconomic work in Africa
was indeed undertaken by economists seeking to
understand agricultural markets and technology
adoption. The behavior of African farmers was
understood as rational but severely constrained by
poverty, ignorance, and missing markets.
These efforts were to have a long-lasting influ-
ence on economics, not only on methods— the
heavy emphasis on the collection of survey data
has become a distinguishing feature of develop-
ment economics everywhere—but also on eco-
nomic thought. Early theorizing on the behavior
of farming households led to subsequent applica-
tions to home production and intra-household
welfare allocation and developed and developing
economies alike. Gary S. Becker was particularly
influential in expanding the domain of economics
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